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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Depew's motion for 
a directed verdict on the issue of Mr. Sullivan's negligence. 
a. Standard of Review: When reviewing a challenge to a trial court's 
denial of a motion for directed verdict, the appellate court must review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party moved against and will sustain the denial if 
reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict. 
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104,116, 990 P.2d 933. 
b. Record Citation: Trial Record [hereafter, "R."] 498 at 348-49. 
2. Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Depew's motion for 
a new trial. 
a. Standard of Review: When reviewing a challenge to a trial court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial, the appellate court examines the record to 
determine whether the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or 
was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust. If there is any evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, the denial of the 
new trial must be affirmed. McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). 
b. Record Citation: R. 441-44, 457-58. 
3. Issue: Whether the district court erred in allowing Officer Stacy Richan to 
offer an opinion regarding the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, If 16, 30 P.3d 436. 
b. Record Citation: R. 498 at 281. 
4. Issue: Whether the district court erred in refusing to allow Mr. Depew to 
inquire whether potential jurors' children had served as missionaries for the LDS 
Church. 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews challenges to the 
trial court's management of jury voir dire under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
b. Record Citation: Add. 10. 
5. Issue: Whether the district court erred in imposing discovery sanctions 
against Mr. Depew's counsel. 
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a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a trial court's 
imposition of sanctions for discovery violations under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Jaime & Marie Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, \ 31, 17 P.3d 
1110. 
b. Record Citation: R. 310-22, 321-22. 
6. Issue: Whether the district court erred in awarding Mr. Sullivan costs for 
the videotaping and transcription of depositions. 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a trial court's 
award of deposition costs under Rule 54 under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Onglnt'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,460 (Utah 1993). 
b. Record Citation: R. 439-40. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative of the issues presented 
and are set forth verbatim in the addendum: UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 4; UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-6-73; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-3; and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5(l)(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which Plaintiff Huey L. Depew ("Mr. Depew") seeks to 
recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained from a collision between Depew's 
motorcycle and the truck operated by Defendant Denton C. Sullivan ("Mr. Sullivan"). 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW 
Mr. Depew brought an action against Mr. Sullivan in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in Washington County, Utah. Mr. Depew's complaint alleged that the collision 
was caused by Mr. Sullivan's negligence. During discovery, the trial court granted Mr. 
Sullivan's motion for sanctions against Mr. Depew and his counsel based upon Mr. 
Depew's failure to respond to discovery requests. 
The case was tried before a jury on November 13 and 14, 2001. At the close of 
evidence, Mr. Depew moved for a directed verdict on the issue of Mr. Sullivan's 
negligence. The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, and the case was 
submitted to the jury. In its verdict, the jury found that Mr. Sullivan was not negligent 
and did not proximately cause Mr. Depew's injuries. Mr. Depew filed a motion for a 
new trial which was denied by the trial court. 
Mr. Depew has appealed the following rulings from the trial court: (1) the 
imposition of sanctions against Mr. Depew's counsel; (2) the denial of Mr. Depew's 
4 
motion for a directed verdict; (3) the denial of Mr. Depew's motion for a new trial; 
(4) the rejection of Mr. Depew's objection to expert testimony from Officer Stacy Richan 
regarding the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle; (5) the rejection of Mr. Depew's 
proposed jury voir dire questions regarding whether jurors had children serving as 
missionaries; and (6) the award of deposition expenses as taxable costs. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the early evening of May 21, 1996, Mr. Sullivan was driving a 1996 Chevrolet 
pickup northwest on Bloomington Drive East near Rio Virgin Drive in St. George, Utah. 
(R. 497 at 53, 81-82; Officer's Accident Report, attached to Appellant's Brief as 
Addendum A [hereafter, "Accident Report"] 1.) In this area, Bloomington Drive East is 
a two-lane road which runs slightly uphill in the direction Mr. Sullivan was traveling. 
(R. 497 at 140; Accident Report 2.) Mr. Sullivan slowed his truck and turned on his left 
turn signal in preparation for turning left into his grandmother's driveway. (R. 428 at 
11-12.) At this location, Bloomington Avenue runs through a residential area, and it is 
common for vehicles traveling on Bloomington Avenue to turn into residential 
driveways. (R. 498 at 260.) 
At roughly the same time, Mr. Depew was driving a racing-style 1991 Suzuki 
GSXR750 motorcycle southeast on Bloomington Avenue toward Mr. Sullivan's vehicle. 
(R. 497 at 53-54, 79, 135.) In the direction Mr. Depew was traveling, Bloomington 
Avenue has a slight downhill grade. (R. 497 at 140; R. 498 at 323.) The posted speed 
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limit on Bloomington Avenue is 25 miles per hour. (R. 497 at 53-54.) Depew's 
motorcycle was traveling between 41 and 46 miles per hour (R. 498 at 282). 
After looking up the road and seeing no approaching vehicles, Mr. Sullivan began 
turning left into his grandmother's driveway. (R. 428 at 12-13.) Upon seeing Mr. 
Sullivan's vehicle turning left in front of him, Mr. Depew hit his brakes and the 
motorcycle tires skidded for approximately 41 feet before the motorcycle slid on its side 
and collided with Mr. Sullivan's truck. (R. 497 at 87-88; R. 498 at 261.) Mr. Depew 
jumped off the motorcycle approximately 20 feet before it collided with the truck. 
(R. 497 at 91.) The motorcycle hit Mr. Sullivan's truck between the truck's rear tire and 
the rear bumper. (R. 428 at 14.) After colliding with Mr. Sullivan's truck, the 
motorcycle slid on its side for an additional 48 feet. (R. 498 at 261.) As the result of the 
accident, Mr. Depew fractured his wrist and suffered other injuries. (R. 497 at 92-93.) 
Mr. Depew filed an action against Mr. Sullivan on November 13, 1997. (R. 497 at 54.) 
During discovery, Mr. Sullivan's counsel served upon Mr. Depew's counsel a 
request for production of documents relating to the case. (R. 22-23.) When Mr. Depew 
failed to respond to these requests, Mr. Sullivan filed a motion to compel Mr. Depew to 
provide discovery responses and to award Mr. Sullivan the attorney's fees incurred in 
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bringing the motion. (R. 82a-84a.1) The court granted Mr. Sullivan's motion to compel 
and entered an order requiring Mr. Depew and his counsel to pay Mr. Sullivan's 
attorney's fees associated with the motion to compel. (Addendum [hereafter 
"Add."] 1,6.) 
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. During voir dire of the jury panel, Mr. 
Depew requested that the trial court inquire whether the jurors had any children serving 
missions for the LDS Church. (Add. 10.) Refusing to ask the jurors this question, the 
trial court instead inquired whether the fact that Mr. Sullivan was on a religious mission 
would prevent the jurors from properly applying the facts to the law. (Add 10 .) None of 
the jurors indicated that Mr. Sullivan's missionary service would prevent them from 
rendering a verdict based upon the facts presented at trial. (Add 10.) 
At the close of evidence at the trial, Mr. Depew moved for a directed verdict on 
the issue of Mr. Sullivan's negligence. (Add. 13.) The trial court denied this motion. 
(Add 13.) By a vote of 7 to 1, the jury returned a verdict indicating that Mr. Sullivan was 
not negligent and did not proximately cause the collision. (R. 498 -at 401.) Mr. Sullivan 
submitted a memorandum of costs (R. 436-38), and Mr. Depew filed a motion asking the 
*It appears that the trial court mistakenly paginated the record so that two different 
documents include pages 81, 82, 83, and 84. Defendant's Motion to Compel is 
designated as pages 82 though 84, and Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Compel is designated as Pages 81 through 90. To clarify, Mr. Sullivan will refer to 
the pages in the Motion to Compel as pages 82a, 83a, and 84a. 
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trial court to scrutinize the appropriateness and amount of these costs (R. 439-40). The 
trial court ultimately entered judgment for costs in the amount requested by Mr. Sullivan. 
(Add. 15.) Mr. Depew also filed a motion requesting a new trial on the grounds that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. (R. 441 -45.) The trial court 
denied this motion. (Add 17.) Mr. Depew then filed the present appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Depew's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied by the trial court 
because the evidence at trial could lead reasonable minds to disagree with Mr. Depew's 
argument that Mr. Sullivan was negligent as a matter of law. This Court should uphold 
the trial court's denial of Mr. Depew's motion for a new trial because Mr. Depew has 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict and because the evidence 
presented at trial adequately supports the jury's findings. The trial court was within its 
discretion in allowing Officer Richan to testify regarding the speed of Mr. Depew's 
motorcycle, even though Officer Richan's expertise in motorcycle accident 
reconstruction was obtained after the accident. The questions asked injury voir dire 
regarding the jurors' feelings about Mr. Sullivan's missionary service were sufficient to 
allow Mr. Depew to challenge jurors for cause and intelligently exercise his peremptory 
challenges. In any event, because a different exercise of Mr. Depew's three peremptory 
challenges would not have garnered the 6 votes out of 8 which are required for a civil 
verdict, any error relating to peremptory challenges was not prejudicial. 
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The trial court was within its discretion to sanction Mr. Depew's counsel for 
failing to provide requested documents which were admittedly in his or his client's 
possession. The trial court did not err in awarding as costs the expenses Mr. Sullivan 
incurred in transcribing and videotaping the depositions because those depositions were 
used at trial and were reasonably necessary to protect Mr. Sullivan's rights in defending 
this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE REASONABLE MINDS COULD DISAGREE WITH THE 
GROUNDS ASSERTED BY MR. DEPEW, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED MR. DEPEW'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Mr. Depew first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed 
verdict on the issue of Mr. Sullivan's negligence. In reviewing the trial court's denial of 
a directed verdict, this court must first "review the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party moved 
against. . . ." Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at f^ 16. Once the evidence is viewed in that 
light, the Court must determine "if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground 
asserted for directing a verdict." Id. If reasonable minds could differ, the denial of the 
motion for a directed verdict must be upheld. Id. In the present case, ample evidence 
was presented at trial which would cause reasonable minds to disagree with the grounds 
asserted by Mr. Depew for a directed verdict. 
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A. Whether Mr. Sullivan Violated Section 41-6-73 Is a Disputed Factual 
Issue and Could Not Be Decided as a Matter of Law 
At trial, Mr. Depew argued that a directed verdict should be entered against Mr. 
Sullivan on the issue of negligence based upon the fact that Mr. Sullivan turned left in 
front of Mr. Depew. Mr. Depew's argument relies upon the following section of the 
Utah Code: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-73. Mr. Depew argues that Mr. Sullivan violated this statute as 
a matter of law. (Appellant's Brief 16.) Based upon this assumption, Mr. Depew asserts 
that such a violation constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence and that the trial 
court erred in not entering a directed verdict on this basis. (Appellant's Brief 10, 16.) 
The problem with Mr. Depew's argument is simple—he has incorrectly assumed 
that, as a matter of law, Mr. Sullivan violated Section 41-6-73. In reality, whether Mr. 
Sullivan violated this provision depends upon factual determinations which must be 
made by the finder of fact. 
Section 41-6-73 is not violated unless three conditions are met. First, a driver 
must be seeking to turn his or her vehicle left. Second, another driver must be 
approaching in the opposite direction whose vehicle is "so close to the turning vehicle as 
to constitute an immediate hazard." Third, the turning driver must fail to yield the right-
10 
of-way to the second driver's vehicle. In the present case, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Sullivan was turning left and that Mr. Depew's motorcycle was approaching from the 
opposite direction. Also, Mr. Sullivan acknowledges that he did not yield the right-of-
way to Mr. Depew's motorcycle. However, a disputed question of fact existed as to 
whether Mr. Depew's motorcycle was "so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an 
immediate hazard." 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue in a case with very similar facts. 
In McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1126, a motorcyclist was injured when he collided with a car 
turning left in front of him at an intersection. The motorcyclist had been following a 
camper which slowed to turn left at an intersection controlled by a flashing yellow light. 
Id. The motorcycle passed the camper on the right and collided with the rear portion of 
the defendant's vehicle. The defendant had been traveling in the opposite direction and 
turned left in front of the motorcyclist. Id. 
11 
At trial, the district court denied the motorcyclist's motion for a directed verdict 
on the issue of the defendant's negligence based upon Section 41-6-73.2 Like the jury in 
the present case, the jury in McCloud found the plaintiff 100 percent liable and the 
defendant without negligence. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court cited and relied upon 
a decision from the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
The [Wisconsin] court further observed that what is reasonable safety 
depends upon the facts in the particular case. An inference of negligence 
does not arise from the fact of collision alone involving a left-turning 
driver. 
McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1127-28. 
The Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial court's denial of a directed verdict, 
holding that the issue of an "immediate hazard" was a question of fact for the jury: 
[Plaintiff] further contends, as a matter of law, he was in such close 
proximity to the intersection at the time defendant commenced her turn he 
constituted an immediate hazard. Based on the expert testimony in the 
record, the court could have found plaintiff was 225.56 feet from the 
intersection at the time defendant commenced her left turn. When this 
distance is considered with the other physical facts, viz., the intersection 
2When the claim in McCloud arose, Section 41-6-73 differed slightly from the 
current statute. At that time, Section 41-6-73 provided as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left 
shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute 
an immediate hazard, during the time when such driver is moving within 
the intersection. 
McCloud, 569P.2datl l27. 
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was controlled by a flashing yellow light and the single lane of travel was 
occupied by a large, slow moving vehicle, there was a question of fact as 
to whether a reasonable person, exercising due care, would have 
apprehended an immediate hazard in executing a left turn. The trial 
court properly submitted this issue to the jury. 
Id. at 1127 (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 312 
P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1957) (holding that determination whether vehicle was 
"approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard" was question of fact for 
the jury). If the evidence can prompt reasonable minds to differ on the issue of whether a 
vehicle is "so close . . . as to constitute an immediate hazard," the issue cannot be decided 
as a matter of law and denial of a motion for directed verdict must be upheld. 
B. Based Upon the Facts Presented at Trial, a Reasonable Juror Could 
Have Disagreed With Mr. Depew's Asserted Grounds For a Directed 
Verdict 
There were ample facts presented at trial to persuade a reasonable juror that when 
Mr. Sullivan began his turn Mr. Depew's motorcycle was not so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. Mr. Sullivan testified that he looked up the road before he started 
turning and saw no vehicle approaching. (R. 428 at 12.) An investigator hired by Mr. 
Depew testified that a vehicle in the position of Mr. Sullivan's truck prior to turning 
would have an unobstructed view of an oncoming vehicle 430 feet away. (R. 497 at 
184). The investigator acknowledged that Mr. Depew would have had a similar 
unobstructed view of Mr. Sullivan's truck from 430 feet away. (R. 497 at 189.) The 
officer investigating the accident estimated that Mr. Depew was traveling between 41 
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and 46 miles per hour before he applied his brakes. (R. 498 at 282). Mr. Depew was 
therefore exceeding the 25-mile-per-hour speed limit by between 16 and 21 miles per 
hour. (R. 497 at 53-54.) Mr. Sullivan testified that the front wheels of his truck were 
already in his grandmother's driveway when the motorcycle collided with the truck. 
(R. 428 at 13.) Mr. Sullivan further stated that the motorcycle collided with his truck 
"right behind the exhaust pipe, further back between the exhaust pipe and the rear 
bumper." (R. 428 at 14.) 
From this evidence, a reasonable juror could have concluded that at the time Mr. 
Sullivan began his left turn, Mr. Depew's motorcycle was far enough away that an 
average person would not have considered the motorcycle an immediate hazard to Mr. 
Sullivan's left-turning vehicle. Moreover, a reasonable juror could have concluded that 
the accident was caused by Mr. Depew's negligence in exceeding the speed limit and 
was not caused by any failure on Mr. Sullivan's part. In fact, in the present case, the 
Court need not rely solely on what hypothetical jurors might do. Seven of the eight 
actual jurors who were empaneled in this case apparently reached this very conclusion, as 
evidenced by the jury's 7-to-l verdict that Mr. Sullivan was not negligent. (R. 498 at 
400-01.) Clearly, reasonable minds could (and did) disagree with Mr. Depew's assertion 
that Mr. Sullivan was negligent as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
denied Mr. Depew's motion for directed verdict on the issue of Mr. Sullivan's 
negligence. 
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II. MR. DEPEW HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
As indicated above, there was a disputed issue of fact at trial regarding whether 
Mr. Sullivan violated Section 41-6-73. In addition, Mr. Depew claims that because "the 
jury should have allocated at least some fault to defendant," a new trial should be 
granted. (Appellant's Brief 16.) In appealing these factual issues, Mr. Depew has the 
burden of "marshal[ing] the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrating] 
that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
Brewer v. Denver Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, f 33, 31 P.3d 557; UTAH R. APP. P. 
24(a)(9). The appellate court "will not overturn a verdict on a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support 
the jury's findings" Id. at ^ 36 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In seeking to overturn factual findings, Mr. Depew "is required to marshal the 
evidence, not simply attack its credibility or offer other contradictory evidence 
supporting the [defendant's] position . . . . " Id. Mr. Depew has not even attempted to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's denial of a directed verdict or the jury's 
verdict. Instead, Mr. Depew has simply attacked the credibility of supporting evidence 
and offered other contradictory evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has held that such an 
approach is inadequate. Id. (ruling that the trial court did not err in denying motion for 
directed verdict). Because the evidence presented at trial was such that a reasonable 
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person could have disagreed with Mr. Depew's basis for a directed verdict, and because 
"some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings," the trial court did 
not err in rejecting Mr. Depew's motion for a directed verdict and denying Mr. Depew's 
motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling on these two motions should 
be upheld. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING OFFICER STACY RICHAN TO OFFER AN OPINION AS 
TO THE SPEED OF MR. DEPEW'S MOTORCYCLE 
Mr. Depew argues that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Stacy Richan to 
offer an opinion as to the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle before Mr. Depew started 
braking. (Appellant's Brief 10-16.) Officer Richan admitted that his expertise in 
estimating the speed of motorcycles was not obtained until after his investigation of the 
Depew accident. (R. 498 at 275-76, 292-93.) Relying on this fact, Mr. Depew concludes 
that Officer Richan "did not possess the expertise to gather and preserve all the material 
evidence at the time he made his investigation to the accident in question" and therefore 
should not have been allowed to opine as to Mr. Depew's speed. (Appellant's Brief 18.) 
However, the validity of Mr. Depew's contention is seriously undermined by his inability 
to cite any supporting case law or legal authority. In addition to being counterintuitive, 
Mr. Depew's argument is contrary to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
16 
A. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion in Determining the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
Determinations as to the qualifications of an expert and the suitability of expert 
testimony are within the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 
723, 276 (Utah 1982) ("It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the 
suitability of expert testimony in a case and the qualifications of the proposed expert."); 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., Ill P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) ("A trial court . . . 
is granted considerable discretion in determining whether an expert is qualified to give 
an opinion on a particular matter."); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) ("Regarding the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, the trial court 
has a wide measure of discretion."). Appellate courts will not overturn the trial court's 
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony unless the trial court abused its broad 
discretion in this area. Pack, 2001 UT App 232 at ^ 35; Gerbich v. Nurned, Inc., 1999 
UT 37,1} 16, 977 P.2d 1205. 
The admissibility of expert witness testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, which provides as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
UTAH R. EVID. 702. In applying this rule, the Utah appellate courts have noted that "the 
critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert has 
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knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it." Wessel, 711 
P.2dat253. 
B. Officer Richan Had the Necessary Knowledge and Expertise to Offer 
an Opinion as to the Speed of Mr, Depew's Motorcycle 
Mr. Depew does not directly argue that Officer Richan lacked the necessary 
"knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education" at the time of trial to opine as to the 
speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. Instead, Mr. Depew makes the novel argument that 
because Officer Richan's expertise was acquired after the Depew accident, Officer 
Richan could not have properly preserved evidence from the accident scene which would 
support his opinion as to the motorcycle's speed. This argument is seriously flawed. 
The evidence presented at trial established that Officer Richan had the 
"knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education" to be qualified as an expert for 
purposes of estimating the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. While working for the 
Wendover Police Department, Officer Richan completed a 40-hour course with the 
Nevada Highway Patrol in accident reconstruction. (R. 498 at 267.) Officer Richan 
subsequently joined the St. George Police Department where he attended a two-week 
school of intermediate and advanced accident investigation. (R. 498 at 256-57.) 
During his nine years of service with the St. George Police Department, Officer 
Richan served four years in the Traffic Enforcement Division and two years in a traffic 
investigations rotation. (R. 498 at 256-57.) Within the two years prior to trial, Officer 
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Richan attended three additional weeks of accident reconstruction training from officers 
in the West Valley and Orem police departments. (R. 498 at 257-58.) Although Officer 
Richan did not have training in motorcycle accident reconstruction at the time he 
investigated the Depew accident, he subsequently received approximately three days of 
training on motorcycle accidents and acquired knowledge of this subject through study of 
manuals and other relevant materials. (R. 498 at 277-78.) In light of this evidence, the 
trial court was within its discretion to hold that Officer Richan had the requisite 
knowledge, skill, expertise, training, and/or education to give his expert opinions as to 
the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. 
C. Mr. Depew Has Not Asserted Any Specific Deficiencies in Officer 
Richan's Investigation and Evidence Gathering 
Although Mr. Depew claims that Officer Richan did not properly preserve 
evidence from the accident scene, Mr. Depew has not identified any specific deficiencies 
in Officer Richan's investigation. While baldly asserting that "[n]o conscientious expert 
in the field of motorcycle accident reconstruction would venture an opinion regarding the 
speed of plaintiff s motorcycle based upon the information Officer Richan gathered and 
preserved in his report," Mr. Depew does not specify what Officer Richan might have 
done differently at the accident scene. It is undisputed that Officer Richan completed an 
accident report which included witness statements, the positions of the vehicles, and 
measurements of the marks from the skidding tires and the scrapes from the sliding 
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motorcycle. (Accident Report 1-2.) Mr. Depew has suggested no reason why the 
evidence preserved in Officer Richan's accident report may not be relied upon by Officer 
Richan in formulating an opinion as to the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. 
While Mr. Depew argues that Officer Richan improperly assumed that both 
wheels of the motorcycle skidded for the entire length of the 41-foot skid mark 
(Appellant's Brief 18), that issue goes to the weight to be given to the testimony and not 
its admissibility: 
Any deficiencies in the [expert's] testimony, however, go to its weight 
rather than to its admissibility. The weight and credibility to be given an 
expert's testimony are matters to be decided by the factfinder. Defense 
counsel may of course challenge the testimony on cross-examination, but 
such challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its 
admissibility. 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983). Mr. Depew had every opportunity to try 
to discredit Officer Richan's opinions through cross-examination or to present his own 
expert to testify regarding the skid marks and the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle. 
However, Mr. Depew is not entitled to keep the evidence away from the jury simply 
because he disagrees with Officer Richan's methodology or conclusions. 
As a practical matter, expert witnesses are allowed (and usually expected) to 
formulate their opinions based upon information gathered by non-experts. Accident 
reconstruction experts almost never have the opportunity to actually gather evidence at 
the scene of the accident. Instead, such experts, who are retained after the fact, utilize 
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information from the police reports and other sources to formulate their opinions about 
the accident. Under Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert witnesses are 
allowed to base their opinions upon facts or data "perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing." UTAH R. EviD. 703; State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ 23, 
1 P.3d 546 ("Thus, under our case law, it is not necessary for experts to have perceived 
all aspects of their testimony personally."). In fact, an expert's opinion can even be 
based upon inadmissible evidence, so long as the facts or data are "of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject. . . ." UTAHR. EVID. 703. 
If a different officer, who did not have extensive experience in recreating 
motorcycle accidents, had gathered the evidence and information from the Depew 
accident scene, Rule 703 would have allowed Officer Richan to testify as to his opinions 
based upon facts or data from that investigation. Similarly, Mr. Depew could have 
retained an expert to provide an opinion based upon Officer Richan's report. There is no 
reason why Officer Richan's lack of motorcycle accident experience at the time of the 
investigation should preclude him from testifying as an expert witness based upon his 
own accident report. If anything, Officer Richan's opinion testimony should be 
considered more reliable because he actually observed the accident scene shortly after the 
accident. 
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In short, Officer Richan was qualified to provide opinion testimony as an expert 
witness, and Rule 703 allowed him to rely upon the information he observed and 
recorded in his accident report. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing 
Officer Richan to provide opinion testimony as to the speed of Mr. Depew's motorcycle 
prior to the accident. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED MR. DEPEW MEANINGFUL AND 
ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE DURING JURY SELECTION 
Mr. Depew claims that the court prevented him from conducting meaningful voir 
dire during jury selection. Specifically, Mr. Depew argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow him to ask jurors whether they had children serving as missionaries for 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "LDS Church"). 
A. The Inquiry Proposed by Mr. Depew Was Limited to Whether 
Potential Jurors Had Children Serving As Missionaries for the LDS 
Church 
At the time of trial, Mr. Sullivan was serving a two-year term as a full-time 
missionary for the LDS Church in Pennsylvania. (R. 497 at 21-22.) The trial court 
granted Mr. Sullivan's motion to present his testimony through a videotaped deposition, 
(R. 244-54, 295) and Mr. Depew has not appealed the trial court's decision to grant that 
motion. During jury voir dire, the following exchange took place between Mr. Depew's 
counsel and the trial court: 
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MR. PRISBREY: There was - obviously, one of the issues has to do with the 
fact Mr. Sullivan is on an LDS mission and I wanted to ask the jury some 
questions as to whether they do have children on missions. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm not going to go that direction because religious 
affiliation has nothing to do with jury service. But let me ask you, ladies and 
gentlemen, there may be evidence given and maybe eventually your decision that a 
judgment should be entered in favor of Mr. Depew, the plaintiff in this matter, and 
against Mr. Sullivan, the defendant. Would the fact that Mr. Sullivan, the 
defendant, is on a religious mission at the present time give you any problem in 
applying the facts in the law as you find it from the evidence in this case? If that's 
a difficulty for you would you raise your hand. The answer there is in the 
negative. . . . 
(Add. 10.) 
In his brief, Mr. Depew argues that he "asked that prospective jurors be required 
to disclose any affiliation they may have with LDS missionaries and to indicate whether 
any potential jurors had served an LDS mission." (Appellant's Brief 19.) This statement 
is not an accurate description of the request made by Mr. Depew's attorney. The trial 
transcript shows that Mr. Depew's attorney simply said he "wanted to ask the jury some 
questions as to whether they do have children on missions" (Add. 10 (emphasis 
added.)) Nowhere in the trial transcript did Mr. Depew's attorney ask the court to 
inquire into the potential jurors' affiliation with the LDS Church or whether the potential 
jurors themselves served as missionaries for the LDS Church. Accordingly, these two 
issues were not preserved at trial and should not be considered on appeal. Doe v. Hafen, 
772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that plaintiff who did not call the 
court's attention to a specific question it desired the court to ask on voir dire failed to 
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preserve the issue for appeal). The only issue remaining before this Court regarding jury 
voir dire is whether the trial court erred in refusing to ask whether any juror had a child 
serving a mission for the LDS Church. 
B. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire 
Examination 
"The trial court has traditionally been given considerable latitude as to the manner 
and the form of conducting the voir dire examination and is only restricted in that 
discretion from committing prejudicial error." State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 643 (Utah 
1988). Thus, this Court must consider whether the trial court's refusal to question 
potential jurors as to LDS Church missions served by their children was an abuse of 
discretion and constituted prejudicial error. The trial court abuses its discretion when, 
"considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded the adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
Jury voir dire has two principal purposes: (1) detecting bias sufficient to 
challenge a prospective juror for cause; and (2) collecting data to permit informed 
exercise of peremptory challenges. Hornsbyv. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 
929, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Mr. Depew's brief does not indicate whether the alleged 
error during voir dire prejudiced his rights with respect to challenges for cause or 
peremptory challenges. Accordingly, both types of juror challenges will be addressed. 
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C. The Appellate Courts in Utah Have Determined When Voir Dire May 
Properly Inquire Into Religious Affiliation and Belief 
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[t]he 
rights of conscience shall never be infringed . . . nor shall any person be incompetent as a 
. . . juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof." UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
The Utah Code provides that "[a] citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury 
service on account of . . . race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, occupation, 
disability, or economic status." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-3. Thus, a juror may not be 
excluded from jury service based solely upon his or her religion. 
1. Under State v. Ball, Parties May Pursue Limited Inquiry Into 
Religious Beliefs Which Are Directly Related to the Subject Matter 
of the Action 
Two decisions of the Utah appellate courts have considered whether inquiry may 
be made into the religious beliefs or associations of potential jurors. The first case, State 
v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), involved a defendant charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol. During voir dire, the trial court asked the potential jurors whether 
any of them had prejudices against people who drink. None responded that they did. Id. 
at 1056. The defendant's counsel then asked if any of the potential jurors chose not to 
drink for any reason. Four potential jurors responded that they did not drink. Id. 
Defendant's counsel asked to inquire if those jurors' choice not to drink was for a 
personal or religious conviction. The trial court refused to present this question to the 
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potential jurors. Id. Defendant removed three of the four non-drinking jurors by 
exercising all three of his peremptory challenges. The fourth teetotaling juror, however, 
sat on the jury that convicted the defendant. Id. at 1057. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant's question regarding the four 
jurors' reasons for not using alcohol should have been allowed. Id. at 1060. The court 
held that if religious beliefs are directly related to the subject matter of the action, a 
preliminary inquiry into those beliefs must be allowed: 
Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race, are not readily apparent, and their 
existence, if directly related to the subject matter of the suit (as they may 
be in a case involving alcohol consumption), must be determined by 
preliminary inquiry. Should those religious beliefs (or the absence thereof) 
be the basis for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality [sic], a challenge for 
cause would likewise lie. 
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized, however, that it had not addressed 
the question of whether a juror's adherence to certain religious beliefs would have 
constituted grounds for dismissal for cause: 
We stress that we do not examine the scope of permissible grounds for a 
challenge for cause relating to claimed bias solely by reason of a person's 
adherence to specific religious beliefs, as that question is not before us. 
We only hold that a question as to the existence of a religious ground for a 
venireman's abstention from alcohol was not prohibited by the Utah 
constitution and should have been allowed. 
Id. at 1060-61. The court also noted that "it does not follow that the person who abstains 
from alcohol for religious or moral reasons will therefore necessarily be unable to act as a 
fair and impartial juror in a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol." Id. at 1060. 
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The Utah Supreme Court also held that the trial court's refusal to inquire into any 
religious convictions against drinking precluded the defendant from intelligently 
exercising his peremptory challenges: 
We view the question asked here by defense counsel as being reasonably 
calculated to discover any latent bias that may have existed among the four 
veniremen who stated that they did not drink; the information sought, even 
if it would not have supported a challenge for cause, would have allowed 
defense counsel to exercise his peremptory challenges more intelligently. 
Id. at 1059-60. 
The court emphasized the trial court's obligation to protect the jurors' privacy 
during the information gathering process. "The criminal defendant's right to a fair trial 
does not create a license in his defense counsel to conduct an inquisition into the private 
beliefs and experiences of a venireman." Id. at 1060. The court concluded, however, 
that the issue of juror privacy was not a concern in the case at hand given the general 
nature of the question and its close relationship to the subject matter of the action: 
The mere revelation of the general fact that a religious belief is the basis of 
a practice, without a further probing of the nature or extent of any 
particular religious belief, does not result in any injury to the juror. Any 
harmless disturbance of a juror's privacy that may occur through the 
revelation of such general information is outweighed by its close relevance 
to the possibility of bias in the context of a trial for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
Id. 
The court ultimately held that the failure to inquire whether the jurors' abstention 
from the drinking of alcohol has a religious basis "was not only error, but also, inasmuch 
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as one of the jurors in question actually sat on the panel that convicted defendant, 
prejudicial error." Id. at 1060. 
The holding in Ball may be summarized as follows: Because religious beliefs are 
directly related to the subject matter of the suit, a defendant charged with driving under 
the influence of alcohol may inquire whether potential jurors have a religious ground for 
abstaining from alcohol. However, any "further probing of the nature or extent of any 
particular religious belief should not be allowed because it would violate the jurors' 
right to privacy. 
2. Under Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, the Utah Court 
of Appeals Held That Jurors May Be Asked About Their Religious 
Affiliation When a Religious Organization Is a Party to the Action 
The second relevant case is Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 929. In Hornsby, the plaintiff 
motorcyclist was injured when he attempted to avoid a collision on a public highway 
with a cow owned by the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the LDS Church. Id. at 
931. At trial, plaintiffs counsel proposed to ask the potential jurors questions regarding 
their church affiliation, including whether they were members of the LDS Church and 
whether they held any leadership positions in the LDS Church. Id. Refusing to ask these 
questions, the trial court instead made the following inquiry: 
Are there any of you who feel that you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings you may have either pro or con with 
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might affect your ability to be a 
fair and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like you to raise your hand. 
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Id. at 931-32. All of the members of the jury panel indicated that religious feelings 
would have no effect on their decision. Id. at 932. The jury ultimately found no 
negligence on the part of the defendant and determined that plaintiffs negligence was 
the proximate cause of his injuries. Id. at 931. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court's refusal 
to make the requested inquiries had affected the plaintiffs right to dismiss jurors for 
cause or to properly exercise his peremptory challenges. The court held that "the 
question asked by the trial court was sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to 
warrant a challenge for cause " Id. at 932. The court also noted that "[t]he religious 
beliefs of prospective jurors are not directly related to the subject matter of this suit, and 
hence could not properly be examined during voir dire." Id. at 933 n.2. 
The court held that the questions regarding the jurors' religious affiliations with 
the LDS Church should have been allowed in order to provide information for the 
plaintiffs informed exercise of his peremptory challenges: 
Both Swain [v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965)] and 
Ball recognize there are cases where religion and group affiliation are 
appropriate topics for voir dire. In the instant case, defendant did not 
propose to question the prospective jurors as to their specific beliefs. 
Rather, as the L.D.S. Church was one of the parties, defendant merely 
proposed to question the jurors regarding their affiliation with the L.D.S. 
Church. Whenever a religious organization is a party to the litigation, voir 
dire regarding the jury panel's religious affiliations is proper. State v. Via, 
146 Ariz. 108, 704 P.2d 238 (1985); Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 
951 (D.C. 1977); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 
Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627(1958). 
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Id. at 933. The court noted that, upon remand, the trial court would retain its 
considerable discretion to "contain voir dire within reasonable limits . . . ," and cited Ball 
with respect to the trial court's duty to protect juror privacy. Id. 
In short, the court in Hornsby held that the trial court's general inquiry into 
whether the jurors' feelings toward the LDS church would affect their impartiality was 
sufficient to detect any bias which would support a challenge for cause. However, for 
purposes of the plaintiffs peremptory challenges, the trial court should have allowed the 
plaintiff to inquire into the jurors' affiliation with the LDS Church because an entity 
associated with the LDS Church was a party. The court emphasized, however, that the 
plaintiff was not allowed to inquire into the jurors' religious beliefs because those beliefs 
were not directly related to the subject matter of the action. 
D. The Trial Court's Inquiry Was Adequate to Detect Any Bias Which 
Would Have Warranted a Challenge by Mr. Depew for Cause 
In the present case, the trial court's questions to the jury panel were sufficient to 
reveal any bias on the part of the jurors which would have warranted a challenge for 
cause. To challenge a juror for cause, a party must establish one or more of the six 
grounds outlined in Rule 47(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Depew has not 
delineated any of the six grounds outlined in Rule 47(f) which he believes would have 
supported a challenge for cause. Because there was no evidence of a familial or financial 
relationship between any potential jurors and the parties, and because there had been no 
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previous trial between the parties, subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 47(f) are not at 
issue. The only possible basis for challenging a juror for cause would be subsection (6) 
which requires "[cjonduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that 
reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially." UTAH R. 
Civ. P. 47(f)(6). 
The trial court's questioning of the jurors was adequate to reveal any "state of 
mind or other circumstances" relating to Mr. Sullivan's connection with the LDS Church 
which could reasonably have led the court to conclude that any juror was not likely to act 
impartially. Specifically, the trial court asked the following question, which was 
answered negatively by all prospective jurors: 
But let me ask you, ladies and gentlemen, there may be evidence given and 
maybe eventually your decision that a judgment should be entered in favor 
of Mr. Depew, the plaintiff in this matter, and against Mr. Sullivan, the 
defendant. Would the fact that Mr. Sullivan, the defendant, is on a 
religious mission at the present time give you any problem in applying the 
facts in the law as you find it from the evidence in this case? If that's a 
difficulty for you would you raise your hand. The answer there is in the 
negative. . . . 
(Add. 10.) This question is very similar to the question asked by the trial judge in 
Hornsby: 
Are there any of you who feel that you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings you may have either pro or con with 
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might affect your ability to be a 
fair and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like you to raise your hand. 
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Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931-32. The Utah Court of Appeals held that this general inquiry 
by the trial judge in Hornsby was adequate to "detect any actual subjective bias to 
warrant a challenge for cause," even when an entity related to the LDS Church was a 
party to the action. Id. at 932. In the present case, where no religious organization is a 
party and religion is not directly related to the subject matter, the trial judge's inquiry to 
the jury panel was more than adequate to detect any bias which would have supported a 
challenge for cause. Accordingly, for purposes of allowing Mr. Depew challenges to 
potential jurors for cause, the trial court did not err in refusing to inquire whether any 
jurors' children were serving missions for the LDS Church. 
E. The Trial Court's Refusal to Inquire as to Jurors' Children Serving as 
Missionaries Did Not Constitute Prejudicial Error With Regard to Mr. 
Depew's Peremptory Challenges 
1. Because a Religious Organization Was Not a Party and the 
Subject Matter Was Not Related to Religion, the Trial Court 
Properly Refused to Inquire Into the Jurors' Personal Religious 
Beliefs 
In Ball, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a party was allowed to inquire into "the 
general fact that a religious belief is the basis of a practice [of abstaining from alcohol], 
without a further probing of the nature or extent of any particular religious belief.. . ." 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060. This inquiry was allowed because of the religious beliefs "close 
relevance to the possibility of bias in the context of a trial for driving under the influence 
of alcohol." Id. In Hornsby, the Utah Court of Appeals allowed inquiry into the 
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potential jurors' association with the LDS Church, to provide information for informed 
peremptory challenges, because "a religious organization is a party to the litigation." 
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 933. In the present case, religion is not directly related to the 
subject matter of the action and no religious organization is a party. Accordingly, neither 
Ball nor Hornsby support Mr. Depew's argument that he should have been allowed to 
inquire about jurors' children serving missions for the LDS Church. 
The voir dire question proposed by Mr. Depew simultaneously asked too much 
and too little. It asked too much because acknowledging that a juror has a child serving a 
mission for the LDS Church is a very strong indication that the juror himself or herself 
adheres to the tenets of the LDS Church. In essence, the question is an indirect way of 
asking if the jurors themselves belong to the church for which Mr. Sullivan was serving a 
mission. The court in Ball never suggested that the parties could inquire into a juror's 
particular religious denomination, and the court in Hornsby only allowed such a question 
because a church entity was a party to the action. 
Mr. Depew's proposed inquiry also asks too little. Jurors who may be biased in 
favor of LDS Church missionaries but who have no children who served missions for the 
LDS Church could have honestly answered his question in the negative without giving 
any indication of their bias. The trial judge's broader question addressed the real issue— 
whether the jurors had any bias for or against LDS Church missionaries. When the 
jurors responded in the negative, no further questioning was necessary. 
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2. Any Error With Respect to Peremptory Challenges Was Not 
Prejudicial to Mr. Depew 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a trial court's error must be prejudicial to 
warrant a reversal. Moton, 749 P.2d at 643. In the present case, the jury voted 7 to 1 that 
Mr. Sullivan was not negligent. Mr. Depew apparently asserts that his inquiry would 
have revealed information which may have persuaded him to exercise his peremptory 
challenges differently. Assuming this to be true for the sake of argument, Mr. Depew's 
three peremptory challenges could have replaced not more than three jurors. UTAH R. 
Civ. P. 47(e.) Thus, even assuming all three new jurors would have voted that Mr. 
Sullivan was negligent, the result would have been a vote of 4 to 4. In order to prevail, 
Mr. Depew was required to obtain a verdict in which at least 6 of the 8 jurors found that 
Mr. Sullivan was negligent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5(l)(e). Thus, even under the 
best possible circumstances for Mr. Depew, it is mathematically impossible for Mr. 
Depew's peremptory challenges to have altered the ultimate verdict. Because additional 
questioning leading to a different exercise of Mr. Depew's peremptory challenges could 
not have changed the verdict, any alleged error relating to peremptory challenges was not 
prejudicial to Mr. Depew and does not justify reversal. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING 
SANCTIONS AGAINST MR. DEPEW'S COUNSEL 
Mr. Depew argues that the trial court erred in imposed discovery sanctions on Mr. 
Depew's counsel. Mr. Depew argues that the sanctions against his counsel were 
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improper because: (1) Mr. Sullivan did not give Mr. Depew's counsel proper notice of 
and an opportunity to defend a request for sanctions against Mr. Depew's counsel; 
(2) Mr. Sullivan's counsel submitted the proposed order without first serving it upon Mr. 
Depew's counsel; and (3) nothing in the record suggests that the failure to provide timely 
discovery should be attributed to Mr. Depew's counsel. None of these arguments 
establishes that the trial court abused its discretion. 
A. Mr. Depew's Counsel Had Adequate Notice of the Potential for 
Sanctions to Be Entered Against Him 
Mr. Sullivan served document requests on Mr. Depew in April of 1998. 
(R. 22-23.) In his Motion to Compel Discovery, which was filed with the court ten 
months later on February 22, 1999, Mr. Sullivan explicitly requested "sanctions as 
allowed under Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 82a.) In his 
supporting memorandum, Mr. Sullivan requested that the court "award attorney's fees to 
defendant's counsel for having to bring this Motion." (R. 89.) At the time Mr. Sullivan 
filed his motion, Rule 37(d) provided as follows: 
. . . In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (1999) (amended in 2000 and 2001). Nowhere in his motion or 
memorandum did Mr. Sullivan ask the court to exclude Mr. Depew's counsel from any 
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sanctions. (R. R. 82a-84a, 81-89.) Clearly, Mr. Sullivan's counsel had notice that the 
court might sanction him in place of or in addition to his client. 
B. Mr. Depew's Counsel Was Given Adequate Opportunity to Object to 
the Order Imposing Sanctions 
Mr. Depew's counsel argues Mr. Sullivan failed to comply with Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration because Mr. Sullivan did not serve a copy of the 
proposed order imposing sanctions upon Mr. Depew prior to filling the proposed order 
with the court. Mr. Depew argues that he was therefore deprived of the opportunity to 
object to the proposed order before it was entered by the court. (Appellant's Brief 24.) It 
is clear from the record, however, that Mr. Depew filed an objection after the proposed 
order was signed by the court and that Mr. Sullivan filed a response to that objection. 
The trial court considered the objection and the response and ruled that the "Objection to 
Award of Attorney's Fees is denied" and that the "[a] ward remains as entered." 
(Add. 8.) Mr. Depew raised his objections to the order which was entered, and the trial 
court considered and rejected those objections. Accordingly, any prejudice to Mr. 
Depew's attorney may have suffered from not being able to object to the proposed order 
in advance was cured when the court subsequently considered and ruled on his objection. 
C. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Broad Discretion in Sanctioning Mr. 
Depew's Attorney 
In ruling upon Mr. Sullivan's motion for sanctions, the trial court noted that Mr. 
Depew's delays in answering discovery were not substantially justified and that there 
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were no circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees unjust. (Add 1.) 
The trial court emphasized that Mr. Depew's medical reports appeared to have been in 
Mr. Depew's or his attorney's possession since October of 1996 but were not provided to 
Mr. Sullivan until "after discovery had run, after the threat of a Motion to Compel, and 
finally, after the filing of a Motion to Compel" on February 22, 1999. (R. 82a-84a; 
Add. 1.) The trial court also noted that Mr. Depew had failed to provide documents 
relating to his lost wage claim, even though Mr. Depew admitted that his tax returns were 
in his possession. (Add. 1.) Under these circumstances, it was certainly within the 
discretion of the trial court to hold that an award of attorney's fees was warranted. Also, 
in light of the fact that the documents which Mr. Sullivan requested were in Mr. Depew's 
possession but were not produced until after a motion to compel was filed, the trial court 
could have concluded (and apparently did conclude) that Mr. Depew's counsel was 
jointly at fault for not obtaining the documents from his client. The trial court was 
clearly acting within its broad discretion in requiring Mr. Depew's counsel to pay the 
attorney's fees Mr. Sullivan incurred in bringing his motion to compel. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING DEPOSITION COSTS 
Mr. Depew argues that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Sullivan costs in the 
amount of $3,085.05 for deposition transcripts and video deposition charges. Mr. 
Depew asserts that these costs should not have been charged to him because: (1) the only 
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deposition used at trial was the video deposition of Mr. Sullivan, and (2) Mr. Sullivan's 
deposition was taken for his own convenience and was not necessary for the trial. Both 
of these assertions are incorrect. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the expenses of taking depositions are 
taxable as costs if "the taking of the deposition and its general content were reasonably 
necessary for the development of the case in the light of the situation then existing." 
Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 493 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 
1972). In supporting the trial court's award of deposition costs, the court in Lawson 
Supply noted that the depositions revealed certain critical facts which were necessary to 
the plaintiffs development of the case. "The trial court, through its inclusion of the 
depositions in the costs, impliedly found them reasonably necessary to protect the 
plaintiffs rights; there appears to be no abuse of discretion involved therein." Id. at 610. 
Another factor the Utah Supreme Court considers is whether "the depositions were used 
at trial on cross-examination, both to impeach veracity and to refresh memory." 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union P. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1052 (Utah 1984). The trial 
court's ruling on whether to award a party costs of depositions is "presumed correct and 
will not be disturbed unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's WayMktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
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In the present case, the depositions taken by Mr. Sullivan were reasonably 
necessary for the development of Mr. Sullivan's defense. Both Mr. Sullivan and Cody 
Plumbhoff (the witness who was in Mr. Sullivan's vehicle at the time of the accident) 
were unavailable to testify at trial. (R. 497 at 21-22.) The videotaped deposition of Mr. 
Sullivan was published at trial and shown to the jury without objection from Mr. Depew. 
(R. 497 at 227; R. 428 at 1-88.) Likewise, Mr. Plumbhoff s videotaped deposition was 
published and shown to the jury. (R. 497 at 195-214.) Mr. Depew's deposition was used 
at trial to impeach Mr. Depew or refresh his memory regarding the speed he was 
traveling (R. 497 at 85.), the injuries he sustained from previous motorcycle accidents (R. 
497 at 132-33), the fact that both tires on the motorcycle skidded (R. 497 at 136-39), and 
Mr. Depew's inability to accurately calculate his lost wages (R. 497 at 145-46). Clearly, 
these three depositions, two of which were actually shown to the jury, were reasonably 
necessary for the development of Mr. Sullivan's defense. 
Mr. Depew argues that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "contain no provision 
for the assessment of costs associated with the production, editing, and using an audio-
visual or tape recorded depositions [sic]." (Appellant's Brief 27.) This is not surprising 
in light of the fact that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain explicit 
provisions for any type of deposition expenses, including transcription, to be taxed as 
costs. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court has held that reasonably necessary 
deposition expenses are properly taxed as costs under Rule 54(d). Highland Constr., 683 
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at 1051. It should be noted that decisions on this issue generally refer to allowing 
"deposition costs" and do not delineate between transcription and videotaping. So long 
as the expenses of making a videotape of a deposition are "reasonably necessary," they 
clearly fall into the category of "deposition costs" which may be awarded to the 
prevailing party pursuant to the trial court's discretion. 
Mr. Depew cites Starling v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 22 S.W.3d 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000) for the proposition that the expense of videotaping a deposition should not be 
taxed as costs. (Appellant's Brief 26.) Mr. Depew fails to note, however, that this 
decision is based upon a court rule in Missouri which provides that "the expense of video 
taping [a deposition] is to be borne by the party utilizing it and shall not be taxed as 
costs." Id. at 216 (citing Mo. R. Civ. PRO. Rule 57.03(c)(6)). In the absence of a similar 
procedural rule in Utah, the holding in Starling does not present a persuasive argument 
for denying an award of expenses for the videotaping of reasonably necessary 
depositions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Mr. 
Depew's motion for a directed verdict and motion for a new tnal. The Court should 
affirm the jury's verdict, the discovery sanctions imposed by the trial court, and the costs 
awarded to Mr. Sullivan by the trial court. 
40 
DATED this _^ day of May, 2002. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUEY L. DEPEW, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DENTON C. SULLIVAN and JOHN DOES 
I-IV, 
Defendants. 
REVISED RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND 
FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 970501868 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This case comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery, filed 
Feb. 22, 1999. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery was filed Mar. 
1, 1999, and Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Objections to Motion to Compel Discovery was 
filed Mar. 10, 1999. A hearing on the Motion occurred Apr. 7, 1999, in which "[t]he Court 
denied the Motion to Compel." See Court Minutes, Apr. 7, 1999. However, at a second hearing 
which occurred on May 12, 1999, Defendants requested that the Court reconsider the Motion. 
After Hearing oral arguments, the Court revised its former ruling and "order[ed] that all 
documents that show damage to the [Plaintiff be] given to counsel [for Defendant] within 30 
days." See Court Minutes, May 12, 1999. The Court did not rule on Defendants' request for 
sanctions at that time, however, but instead took the matter under submission. 
Having reviewed the parties memoranda and affidavits, and having reviewed relevant 
Utah law, the Court now issues the following: 
RULING 
Before the Court addresses the issue of Sanctions, it first provides a brief legal 
explanation regarding its decision to revise its former ruling. 
(1) Revision 
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides as follows: 
. . . Any decision which adjudicates fewer than all the claims shall not terminate the 
action, and the order or decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
In other words, a ruling may be revised at any time by the Court, provided final judgment has not 
been made in the case. Furthermore, pertinent case law holds that such a revision may be based 
upon the presentment of the matter in a "different light," or upon "manifest injustice," among 
other things. See, e.g., Tremblv v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (Utah 1994). 
In the present case, the Court's revision of its previous Apr. 7, 1999 ruling is based upon 
the manifest injustice which it perceives would result if Plaintiff were allowed to further delay 
discovery, and also upon the arguments made by counsel for Defendants at the May 12, 1999 
hearing which the Court believes place matters in this case a different light. 
(2) Sanctions 
An important part of the rules of civil procedure, the rules of discovery "were designed to 
secure 'the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" See W.W. &W.B. 
Gardner. Inc. v.Park W.Vil, 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977)(citmg Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a)). 
Indeed, "[a] party to an action has a right to have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly . . 
. ." Id. However, the decision of whether to impose any sanctions under Rule 37 is 
"discretionary with the court," and will not be set aside on appeal absent a showing of "abuse of 
discretion." See G.M. Leasing Com, v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534P.2d 1244, 1245 
(Utah 1975). 
Outlining the basis upon which a Court may impose sanctions after a party fails to answer 
discovery, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides as follows: 
. . . in lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to 
act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Moreover, "[ujnder Rule 37(d) sanctions are justified without reference to whether the 
unexcused failure to make discovery was wilful." See Gardner, Inc., supra. Furthermore, "once 
the motion for sanctions has been filed, the opposing party may not preclude their imposition by 
making a belated response in the interim between the filing of the motion for sanctions and the 
hearing on the motion." Id. at 737. 
In the present case, it is not apparent to the Court that Plaintiffs delays in answering 
discovery were in any way "substantially justified." See Rule 37(d). Nor does it appear "that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Id. Rather, the Court tends to agree 
with Defendants' assertions that "Plaintiffs attorney cannot in good faith claim to the Court that 
no sanctions are justified when the [medical] reports [appear to have been] in his or his client's 
possession [since October, 1996] and were not provided to Defendants' counsel until after 
discovery had run, after the threat of a Motion to Compel and finally, after the filing of a Motion 
to Compel." See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Objections to Motion to Compel 
Discovery, p. 2 [hereinafter Defendants' Response Memo]. Moreover, given Plaintiffs failure to 
provide Defendant with the requested discovery related to lost wage claims, despite Plaintiffs 
admission that the requested tax returns were in fact in his possession, the Court also tends to 
agree with the contention that "Defendants] should not have to file a Motion to Compel to 
obtain that which was due pursuant to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents[, and accordingly the attorney fees [and expenses] for the filing of the Motion 
should be granted." Id. at 4. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendants request for sanctions against Plaintiff is hereby-
granted Counsel for Defendants is directed to prepare an affidavit of costs and expenses incurred 
by the bringing this motion, and submit it to the Court within 15 days of the date hereof 
Dated this 2~ / day of June, 1999. 
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/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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1 but t h a t ' s probably as f a r as I'm w i l l i n g to go . Do you 
2 want t o make any f u r t h e r record on i t , Mr. P r i sb rey? 
3 MR. PRISBREY: I s t h a t the e n t i r e l i s t of 
4 questions? 
5 THE COURT: Yes, counsel. 
6 MR. PRISBREY: Question number 29, will you 
7 ask that? 
8 THE COURT: Let me get to 2 9 here. I'm not 
9 going to cover that, counsel. 
10 MR. PRISBREY: I do have a record to make. Do 
11 you want me to make that now or do you want me to 
12 reserve it? 
13 THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and reserve 
14 it if you would like. Mr. Matthews, I've found your 
15 voir dires here in the file and now I have lost them 
16 again. 
17 MR. MATTHEWS: I think you have covered all of 
18 them. 
19 THE COURT: We have covered everything we 
20 needed. All right. 
21 MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, can we talk about a 
22 few issues in chambers? 
23 THE COURT: Certainly, counsel. If you want 
24 to bring those now, let's go ahead and do it. 
25 MR. PRISBREY: There was -- obviously, one of 
CitiCourt LLC 
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the issues has to do with the fact Mr. Sullivan is on an 
LDS mission and I wanted to ask the jury some questions 
as to whether they do have children on missions. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm not going to go that 
direction because religious affiliation has nothing to 
do with jury service. But let me ask you, ladies and 
gentlemen, there may be evidence given and may be 
eventually your decision that a judgment should be 
entered in favor of Mr. Depew, the plaintiff in this 
matter, and against Mr. Sullivan, the defendant. Would 
the fact that Mr. Sullivan, the defendant, is on a 
religious mission at the present time give you any 
problem in applying the facts in the law as you find it 
from the evidence in this case? If that's a difficulty 
for you would you raise your hand. The answer there is 
in the negative. Anything else, counsel? 
MR. PRISBREY: There was also an issue, your 
Honor, that Mr. -- or I don't know if it was an issue, 
but Mr. Depew was a barber at the time, and if any of 
the potential jurors have any specialized knowledge or 
they work in that field. Would you ask that question? 
THE COURT: All right. Is this a loss of 
wages for a period of time, counsel? 
MR. PRISBREY: It is, your Honor, and his loss 
of ability to engage in that profession any longer. 
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testimony of Dr. Green also indicated that that 
necessitated as a result of his accident. 
. would be 
We would ask for a directed verdict relative 
to negligence on the part of Mr. Sullivan as we ill as the 
testimony before the court was that Mr. Sullivan turned 
left across the lane of traffic in front of my 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. The 
client. 
motions 
are denied. As well, the record is adequate to bring 
this matter to the attention -of the jury. Anything else 
we need to do except bring the jury back in and read and 
argue? All right. Madam Bailiff, if you will 
the jury back into the courtroom we will go to 
(The jury was excused.) 
THE CLERK: Your Honor, there is one 
far as Exhibits. 
MR. 
THE 
Exhibits? 
MR. 
PRISBREY: Oh, yeah. 
COURT: Oh, do we have a problem 
PRISBREY: Your Honor, there was 
with the Exhibits. 
MR. 
problem. You 
were numbered 
MATTHEWS: Your Honor, there was 
had two number 20's, two Exhibits 
20, and we by stipulation agreed 
those. The 20fs were --
THE 
1 
accompany 
work. 
thing as 
with 
a problem 
a 
that 
to change 
CLERK: The medical records and then the 
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PaulH Matthews (#2122) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
PO Box 45120 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone (801)328-3600 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUEY L DEPEW 
Plaintiff, 
DENTON C SULLIVAN 
Defendants 
JUDGMENT OF COSTS 
Civil No 970501868 
Judge James L Shumate 
The above-referenced matter, having come befoie the Court for Trial on November 13 
and 14, 2000, a judgment on the verdict having been entered in favor of the Defendant 
subsequent to jury deliberation, the Defendants having submitted a Memorandum of Costs 
pursuant to Rule 54(D) it is, 
NOW, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendants are ordered taxable costs in the amount of Three Thousand Eighty-five and 05/100 
Dollars ($3,085.05) as against the Plaintiff. 
DATED this _J__ day ofDeddmfe 200(1 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Gordon J. Low JO rxx-^  i , ^K^maS*-* 
W \4SOO\4740\01 79\phmJudjjmeiuDefJudgCostipld wpd 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TO: Judge G. Rand Beacham 
"Judge James L. Shumate 
Re: Case# ^iDSp/^UJ ^ 
Plaintiff: [4ftJLL/ Qx )%u) '^~ 
vs 
Defendant: l o W ^ V , tuJULva,^ 
A Notice to Submit for Decision/ Request for Ruling was filed on the J_ day of t^eJ^ , 
20 0 / , by attorney for plaintiff 
^a t to rney for defendant rc^^J "Tf flrfCjJ&'dUt*^ 
other 
The following motions are submitted for decision: 
PLA's DEF's Motion for Summary Judgment 
PLA's DEF's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
PLA's /^I^EF's Motion to Dismiss Compel Continue 
I 
COURT'S RULING: fi/lsfft jtA^ f t C\ 
Dated this 7 day of ..206/ 
I hereby certify that on the ,5* day of P-*UL 
foregoing Court's Ruling to the following: 
?ia/f £*& C.Sty trt $>#/¥<-
District Court Judge 
, 20£/ , I mailed a copy of the 
f By haH/ x 
Deputy Clerk 
Paul H.Matthews (#2122) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUEY L. DEPEW 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DENTON C. SULLIVAN 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 970501868 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The Court, having considered the Motion for a New Trial filed by the Plaintiff, having 
reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum, having reviewed the Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition, and having reviewed the Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, orders as 
follows: 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that: 
The Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
DATED this / J day of February, 2001 
BY THE COURT: 
W.\450O\474O\0179\phmOrderNewTnalpld. wpd 
UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 4: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office 
of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be 
incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall 
any church dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-73: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-3: 
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service on account of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, occupation, disability, or 
economic status. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5: 
(1) A trial jury consists of: 
(a) twelve persons in a capital case; 
(b) eight persons in a criminal case which carries a term of 
incarceration of more than one year as a possible sentence for the 
most serious offense charged; 
(c) six persons in a criminal case which carries a term of 
incarceration of more than six months but not more than one year as 
a possible sentence for the most serious offense charged; 
(d) four persons in a criminal case which carries a term of 
incarceration of six months or less as a possible sentence for the 
most serious offense charged; and 
(e) eight persons in a civil case at law except that the jury shall be 
four persons in a civil case for damages of less than $20,000, 
exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney fees. 
(2) Except in the trial of a capital felony, the parties may stipulate upon the 
record to a jury of a lesser number than established by this section. 
(3) (a) The verdict in a criminal case shall be unanimous. 
(b) The verdict in a civil case shall be by not less than three-fourths 
of the jurors. 
(4) There is no jury in the trial of small claims cases. 
(5) There is no jury in the adjudication of a minor charged with what 
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. 
Add -it 
